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Developing a Framework to Assess
Financial Stability: Conference
Highlights and Lessons
Olivier de Bandt, Bank of France and Céline Gauthier and Pierre St-Amant,
Bank of Canada
The Bank of Canada hosted its sixteenth annual economic conference in Ottawa on 7 and 8 November
2007. Papers and discussions presented by an international group of economists focused on such topics
as stress testing ﬁnancial systems, models for assessing risks to ﬁnancial stability, and the effects of
linkages among payment, clearing, and settlement systems.
eveloping a framework to assess financial
stability is an important subject for central
banks, both because of their involvement in
various aspects of the work on financial
system stability and because the framework currently
in place is still rather rudimentary. On the monetary
policy side, clear policy strategies have been identiﬁed
and are supported by well-developed macroeconomic
models; central banks are still deﬁning their approach
to questions of ﬁnancial stability, however, and are at
an early stage in the development of useful models.
The objective of the conference was to stimulate
progress in further developing the ﬁnancial-stability
framework.
In this article, we report on conference highlights and
propose directions for future research on financial-
stability issues. We begin by reporting on the experi-
ences of central banks with stress-testing exercises
performed in the context of the International Monetary
Fund’s (IMF) Financial Sector Assessment Program
(FSAP), which is designed to help countries identify
vulnerabilities in their financial system and to deter-
mine necessary reforms. Recent FSAP work on stress
testing provides a good illustration of the progress
that has been made in ﬁnancial-stability analysis and
clearly points to various areas where progress is
needed. This is followed by a discussion of each of the
three frameworks proposed by conference participants
as having good potential to generate such progress: the
contingent-claims-analysis (CCA) framework, the semi-
structural framework, and structural financial-stability
models. We then report on discussions about the
implications for financial stability of linkages among
payment, clearing, and settlement systems.1 We
conclude with some suggestions for future research
priorities.
Experiences with FSAP Macro Stress
Testing
In 2006, Canada invited the IMF to examine the country’s
ﬁnancial system under its FSAP. An important com-
ponent of FSAP was a stress-testing exercise to assess
the ability of Canada’s financial system to resist various
adverse shocks and to respond to a scenario repre-
senting a disorderly resolution of global imbalances.
As a key participant in the stress-testing exercise, the
Bank of Canada organized a panel session at the
conference on central banks’ experiences with FSAP
1.  The full text of selected conference papers and some of the discussants’
presentations are available on the Bank’s website at <http://
www.bankofcanada.ca/en/conference_papers/econ_conf07/papers.html>.
A partial list of the conference papers and presentations is provided at the
end of this article.
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stress testing, with the objective of sharing experiences
and identifying strengths and areas for improvement.
In a session open to all conference participants, central
bankers from Australia, France, Denmark, and Can-
ada made short presentations that were intended to
stimulate discussion among participants.
Stress testing will be an important
component of the framework, since it
can be used to assess the ﬁnancial
system’s robustness to negative
shocks and scenarios.
The four countries have shared similar FSAP experi-
ences, which included using single-factor shocks and
macroeconomic scenarios to assess the stability of
financial systems. While single-factor shocks have
focused on liquidity and market risks, macroeconomic
scenarios have focused on credit risk. The choice of
shocks and scenarios to be simulated emerged from
discussions between the IMF and the various national
authorities. Among the single-factor shocks were
sudden interest rate changes and abrupt illiquidity in
certain markets. As for the macroeconomic scenarios,
central banks have often taken the lead in designing
the details of scenarios that have been agreed upon
with the IMF. For instance, the Bank of Canada used
its version of the Global Economy Model (BoC-GEM)
to design a coherent scenario of a disorderly resolution
of global current account imbalances (Coletti et al.
2007).2 This macro scenario was supplemented with
single equations linking sectoral default probabilities
with macroeconomic variables (Misina and Tessier
2007).3 In some cases, developing the macroeconomic
scenario(s)hasbeenajointeffortbyvariousauthorities.
In Australia, for example, developing the macroeco-
nomic scenarios (sharp decline in house prices, difﬁ-
culties experienced by banks in obtaining foreign
funding) was a joint effort by the Treasury, the pru-
dential regulator, and the central bank (Aylmer 2007).
2.   The approach to monitoring and analyzing international risks that is pre-
sented in Maier, Paulin, and Santor (2007) shares common characteristics with
the approach used for Canada’s FSAP stress testing: risk identiﬁcation, devel-
opment of a macroeconomic scenario with a structural model, and analysis of
the potential implications of the scenario.
3.   An alternative approach to modelling default probabilities was presented
at the conference by Jiménez and Mencía (2007).
Bottom-up and top-down approaches have been used
to simulate the impact of shocks and scenarios on
ﬁnancial institutions. In a bottom-up approach, simu-
lations are performed by financial institutions with
their own internal models. In a top-down approach,
the IMF and/or the national authorities use their
models and the information they have about ﬁnancial
institutions’ exposures to measure the impact of shocks
and scenarios. In most cases, top-down and bottom-up
approaches have produced similar results. An excep-
tion was Denmark where, because of differences in
assumptions concerning loss-given default, top-down
results showed more severe outcomes for financial
institutions (IMF 2007; Lund 2007).
There was general agreement at the conference that
there are signiﬁcant net beneﬁts from participating in
FSAP stress testing. It can promote co-operation among
the various government authorities involved and
improve communication between these authorities
and financial institutions. It can also reveal useful
information about the exposure of financial institutions
to various types of risk and stimulate the development
of stress-testing tools.
Of particular interest will be stress-
testing methods that can be used to
assess potential contagion risks and
feedback effects between the ﬁnancial
system and the real economy.
The FSAP stress-testing exercises discussed at the
conference show that much progress has been made in
developing macro stress-testing tools. Only a few years
ago, macro stress testing could not have been performed
in most countries; now, useful tools are available to
assess credit risk in banks’ loan portfolios. Nevertheless,
current tools have important limitations. In particular,
existing bottom-up and top-down approaches do
not allow for an integrated analysis of the types of risk
affecting financial institutions (market, credit, liquidity,
etc.). In practice, these risks are likely to be correlated,
which could accentuate the impact of severe negative
shocks. As well, existing tools do not factor in contagion
effects between various components of the ﬁnancial
system and feedback effects between this system and
the real economy. Since the models used by ﬁnancial
institutions are not likely to include feedback and29 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2008
contagion effects, factoring in these effects could be
a significant contribution of top-down approaches.
Finally, the links between the macro models used to
design the scenarios and the tools used to assess their
impact on ﬁnancial institutions tend to be ad hoc.4
The Contingent-Claims-Analysis
Framework
A contingent claim is a financial asset whose future
payoff depends on the value of another asset. The
best-known contingent claim is an option—the right
to buy or sell a speciﬁed asset at a pre-speciﬁed exer-
cise price, by a certain expiration date. When applied
to the analysis and measurement of credit risk at the
firm level, the CCA is commonly called the Merton
model. Gray, Merton, and Bodie (2002) proposed an
extension of the CCA to generate a risk-adjusted
balance sheet at the national level where the sectors of
the economy are viewed as interconnected portfolios
of assets, liabilities, and guarantees.5
Gray, Merton, and Bodie (2007) presented applications
of such a framework to Chile and proposed different
ways of doing stress testing through the estimation of
reduced-form equations or factor models linking the
risk indicators identified by the CCA to macro variables.
The last section of their paper discusses ways of
integrating indicators of financial risk (such as those
generated by the CCA) with monetary policy mod-
els. The discussant, Jack Selody, was of the view that
the CCA approach is promising, in particular because
itallows for a clear quantification of default risks and
can be a good monitoring tool. He noted important
limitations of this approach, however, including that it
does not explicitly model the behaviour of economic
agents and is not able to factor in the role of policy
instruments. Pierre Duguay commented that, while
instructive, the sectoral aggregation proposed by
Gray, Merton, and Bodie could not be used to identify
important sources of ﬁnancial stress, such as loss of
conﬁdence in counterparties.
Souissi (2007) uses the CCA to evaluate the risks in the
Canadian mortgage portfolio. He calculates the proba-
bility of default for different loan-to-value (LTV) ratios
and combines them with the distribution of Canadian
mortgages by LTV to obtain an estimation of the over-
4.   de Bandt (2007) presented work to better link developments in the corpo-
rate debt market to implied stress-testing scenarios and their impact on
French banks.
5. For an application to the Canadian business sector, see Kozak, Aaron, and
Gauthier (2006).
all rate of default in the mortgage portfolio. Souissi
also analyzes the impact of changes in housing prices
on the decision to default. The model could be used to
assess the impact of changes in the LTV distribution
on the level of risk in the mortgage portfolio.
Tools based on the contingent-claims
analysis are worth developing further
because they provide a useful
framework to monitor and quantify
default risks.
Allenspach and Monnin (2007) use the CCA to shed
light on two questions: What is the impact of inter-
national integration on banks’ exposure to shocks
between 1993 and 2006? And what is its impact on
systemic risk in the international banking sector? To
answer the ﬁrst question, they analyze the evolution
of the correlations between banks’ asset-to-debt
(AD) ratios using a new method to estimate the joint
dynamics of the AD ratios of all banks. To answer
the second question, they analyze the evolution of an
index of systemic risk proposed by Lehar (2005).
Lehar’s index measures the probability of observing a
systemic crisis (deﬁned as a given number of simulta-
neous bank defaults) at a given time. Both the AD
ratio and Lehar’s index are based on the market value
of banks’ assets assigned by the Merton model. As well,
the authors try to determine whether there is a link
between banks’ common exposures and systemic risk.
Their findings are that: (i) common exposures have
decreased in the ﬁrst part of the sample and increased
in later parts; (ii) there is no signiﬁcant trend in their
measure of systemic risk; and (iii) common exposures
as measured by correlations between banks are not a
reliable measure of systemic risk. Discussant Ramdane
Djoudad emphasized the difficulty of translating linear
correlations into non-linear measures of systemic risks.
In summary, the CCA approach appears particularly
useful for measuring and monitoring default risk, at
least as perceived by the market. It is likely, however,
to be of limited use in the study of stress scenarios.
The Semi-Structural Framework
The potential for contagion between ﬁnancial institu-
tions may have increased with the size and complexity30 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2008
bilateral exposures are not disclosed, it may underesti-
mate the largest exposures and contagion risks.
Céline Gauthier expressed reservations about the
approach used by Frisell et al. First, some double
counting may occur, since publicly known interbank
exposures should already be integrated in market
prices. This would lead to some overestimation of
risk. Second, stress testing based on Monte Carlo
simulations of the multivariate distribution of asset
correlations does notallowforexplicitlinkagesbetween
the real economy and the banking system, whereas a
balance-sheet approach, such as the one followed by
Allessandri, does.
The semi-structural framework offers
some promising developments for the
analysis of various types of contagion
effects.
The semi-structural framework seems to have good
potential for addressing some of the present weak-
nesses of the models and approaches used to analyze
financial-stability risk. In particular, it offers some
promising developments for the analysis of various
types of contagion effects. Nevertheless, its main limi-
tations are that it is not always based on well-speciﬁed
microfoundations, and it may not account for feed-
back effects between the real economy and the financial
sector. An objective of structural financial-stability
models is to address these limitations.
Structural Modelling
Dimitrios Tsomocos presented results based on a
calibrated version of the Goodhart, Sunirand, and
Tsomocos (2006) model. This is a microfounded gen-
eral-equilibrium model with endogenous default and
heterogeneous agents, which treats banks’ defaults as
an equilibrium phenomenon. Policy instruments are
factored in, notably through capital-adequacy require-
ments.
Aspachs et al. (2007) suggest ways to assess the stability
of the overall banking system using a two-factor model
that includes banks’ default rates and proﬁtability. At
this stage, both indicators are based on market data:
The probability of default is estimated from CCA-
based distance-to-default data calculated by the IMF,
of their interconnections. One goal of the semi-struc-
tural framework is to integrate some of the potential
contagion channels that exist between ﬁnancial insti-
tutions. A first channel comes from direct balance-sheet
interlinkages between financial institutions, i.e., distress
at one bank may cause distress at another because of
mutual exposures. A second channel for contagion is
the impact of fire sales of the assets of a distressed
institution on both its own marked-to-market balance
sheet and on those of other institutions holding the
same class of assets.
Cifuentes, Ferrucci, and Shin (2005) discuss the case
where a bank that fails to meet its regulatory capital
ratio may feel the need to sell some of its liquid assets
in order to reduce the size of its balance sheet. If this
is not sufficient, illiquid assets may have to be sold.
Because of their illiquidity, their price goes down in a
non-linearwaywiththeamountsold.6Thiscouldaffect
the balance sheet of other institutions so that they
would also fail to meet their minimum capital require-
ment and, in turn, would need to take measures to
reduce the size of their balance sheets.
Pier Allessandri (Bank of England) presented work
that explicitly integrates these two channels into a
quantitative framework for gauging systemic risk. He
also suggested ways to quantify the impact on banks’
balance sheets of macro credit risk, interest income
risk, and market risk.7
Frisell et al. (2007) adopt a method proposed by
Elsinger, Lehar, and Summer (2006) to analyze the
stability of the Swedish banking system, relying mostly
on market data. Their approach captures both corre-
lated exposures of banks and mutual credit exposures
that can cause domino-effect insolvencies. The main
contribution of the paper by Frisell et al. is on the data
side. The four largest banks, representing 80 per cent
of total bank assets in Sweden, have reported their
15 largest counterparty exposures since 1999. Data
include both on- and off-balance-sheet items, such
as credit commitments, guarantees, derivatives, etc.
Exposures between banks are found to be very asym-
metric and to vary considerably over time. Frisell et al.
ﬁnd that although the use of entropy maximization to
estimate bilateral exposures on the basis of aggregate
exposures may be the best possible approach when
6.   In its current applications, an ad hoc non-linear inverse demand curve is
assumed for the illiquid assets.
7.   The paper is currently not available.31 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2008
and proﬁtability is represented by equity values. The
authors use a reduced-form vector-autoregression
approach to evaluate the impact of the two ﬁnancial-
fragility “factors” on output. In his discussion of the
paper, Césaire Meh stressed that the model included a
large number of free parameters and that the exclu-
sive focus on banking intermediation was at variance
with increasingly market-based financial systems. He
expressed concern that the empirical reduced-form
applications of the model might have only weak links
with the theoretical model. He also indicated that
capital ratios could be determined endogenously by
banks and were not entirely determined by regulators.
During the final panel discussion, Charles Goodhart
and Pierre Duguay agreed that the focus on banks was
fully warranted, given their role in providing the
means of payment.
The existence of coordination failures and the “special”
role for money in the business cycle and in macroeco-
nomics were highlighted by David Laidler as arguments
in favour of a role for the central bank as lender of last
resort (LLR) and, therefore, for the development of
models with a non-trivial monetary/ﬁnancial sector.
In his John Kuszczak Memorial Lecture, Laidler
reviewed economic history back to the early nineteenth
century. A general theme was that, historically, the
business cycle was actually considered a credit cycle.
Nowadays, the success of central banks in maintaining
price stability should pave the way for them to take
a more active role in the area of financial stability.
Indeed, both the monetarist tradition, which stresses
the possible discrepancy between the supply of and
demand for money, and the Wicksellian tradition,
which highlights discrepancies between savings and
investment (a form of coordination failure), indicate
that stabilizing the inflation rate is not sufficient to
stabilize the real economy and eliminate the risk of
ﬁnancial instability.
Several contributors picked up on the observation
made by both David Laidler and Charles Goodhart that,
in the absence of default risk (i.e., if borrowers would
repay their debt with certainty), there would not be
any need for money. This calls for augmenting the
dynamic-stochastic general-equilibrium model
currently used with success in the analysis of price
stability by incorporating the risk of default. The
analysisoffinancialstabilitywouldrequireinvestigating
additional transmission channels (such as the financial
accelerator), constructing richer models than repre-
sentative-agent models, and considering the difference
in behaviour between “tranquil” and “crisis” periods.
The need to capture the amplifying effect triggered by
fluctuationsinfinancialpriceswasalsoajointconclusion
of the three ﬁnal panellists.
Payment, Clearing, and Settlement
Systems
Conference participants also investigated a third theme:
how systemic risk may arise from the transmission of
shocks in payment, clearing, and settlement systems.
Different papers addressed these issues through the
lens of liquidity management, which appeared to have
been crucial during the subprime crisis and is charac-
terized, among other things, by a reduced willingness
of ﬁnancial institutions to transact with other partici-
pants. Liquidity is a broad concept, however. Payment
and settlement systems are usually not the primary
sources of liquidity shock, even if they might transmit
shocks across banks or market participants, particularly
in cases where, by delaying payments, participants
create system gridlock. From that point of view, pay-
ments-system experts observed no unusual behaviour
in the subprime crisis, although caution is still warranted.
Given their signiﬁcant role in linking
the components of the ﬁnancial
system, it is important that further
progress be made in the research on
payment, clearing, and settlement
systems.
Several perspectives on these systems were reﬂected
at the conference. First, Larry Radecki presented the
provisional conclusions of the “Report of the Working
Group on System Interdependencies,”8 one of which is
that, given the complexity of current payment and
security settlement systems, participants often have
little information on the other participants and on the
degree of interdependencies among them (CPSS 2007).
Its most surprising result is that large global banks
do not pose a high degree of risk, since most of them
operate through correspondents in foreign countries
and have limited direct linkages with payment and
security systems. Discussant Charles Freedman com-
mended the report for providing a useful taxonomy,
8.  The paper is currently not available.32 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2008
including a three-by-three matrix distinguishing these
interdependencies along two dimensions: the form of
interdependence (system, institution, and environment)
and the type of relationship (clearing and settlement,
risk management, and operational relationships).
He pointed out, however, that the report focused
on benign conditions, but said little about crisis periods.
Second, Bech, Chapman, and Garratt (2007) addressed
the issue of the liquidity in payment systems, with
reference to the Canadian Large Value Transfer
System. The two main innovations of the paper are
that it formally models the network of relations among
banks in the payment system, and it estimates the
main parameters of this model. Liquidity is determined
by bilateral credit limits and by self-generated credit
created by the bank’s ability to delay payments.
Using the special mathematical properties of the pay-
ment network (i.e., the structure of flows among banks),
the authors manage to estimate the stationary
structure of the network, as well as the degree of delay
in processing the payment orders.
Commentator Thorsten Koeppl congratulated the
authors for the originality of their approach and the
focus on the delay parameter, which is indeed crucial.
This stands in contrast to traditional methods, where
the resilience of the network is generally assessed
through its response to simulated shocks. Indeed,
the ability of banks to slow outgoing flows has often
been acknowledged as creating gridlock in payment
systems and, hence, systemic risk. Nevertheless,
beyond its mathematical complexity, the model is only
descriptive and does not explain the behaviour behind
the delay parameters. Banks may delay in response to
either shocks or heterogeneous characteristics, which
may depend on size or competition. From a policy
perspective, this limits the conclusions that can be
drawn from the model.
The issue of liquidity was also the central question
investigated by Schanz (2007), although with particular
emphasis on foreign exchange (FX) transactions.
Schanz considered how the coordination of liquidity
management within ﬁnancial institutions affects the
transmission of liquidity shocks, using a model that
compares local banks to a global bank with subsidiaries.
He addressed the very topical issue of possible market
failure in the domestic interbank market (resulting
from adverse selection), which might prevent liquid-
ity-rich banks from lending to liquidity-strapped banks.
His main conclusion is that, for financial institutions,
going global implies an increased risk of technical
defaults, because banks with high solvency risk would
not be able to reﬁnance themselves, either domesti-
cally or via FX transactions, in response to liquidity
outflows. This is partly offset, however, by a lower
transmission of losses within and across systems. In
her comments, Alexandra Lai notably stressed the
need to take into account market structure, which can
affect how funding decisions are made during a crisis,
and the need to look at various types of shocks (in
particular, global liquidity shocks).
Conclusion
This sixteenth annual Bank of Canada economic
conference provided an opportunity for researchers to
exchange information on the various strands of research
that are contributing to the development of a frame-
work to assess ﬁnancial stability.
There is no doubt that stress testing will be an impor-
tant component of the framework, since it can be used
to assess the ﬁnancial system’s robustness to negative
shocks and scenarios. Signiﬁcant progress has been
made in the development of stress-testing methods,
including some that have been used in FSAP exercises.
Various areas for further improvement remain, how-
ever. Of particular interest will be methods that could
be used to assess potential contagion risks and feed-
back effects between the ﬁnancial system and the real
economy. As well, the various types of risk need to be
better integrated into the analysis. Some of the confer-
ence papers, in particular those using a semi-structural,
network-based approach, demonstrate the signiﬁcant
progress being made in both the analysis of contagion
channels and in integrating the analysis of different
types of risk.
Structural general-equilibrium models could also be
used to perform macro stress testing. The general-
equilibrium model presented at the conference by
Goodhart, Sunirand, and Tsomocos (2006) incorporates
many of the desirable features of a stress-testing model.
The model is very complex, however, and seems difﬁ-
cult to calibrate or estimate with actual data. As well,
there may be considerable distance between the more
theoretical general models and the versions to be used
with actual data. More work is needed in evaluating
and developing this type of model.
The contingent-claims analysis suffers from some
limitations. In particular, it does not explicitly model
the behaviour of economic agents and is of limited
usefulness in performing stress-testing, or counterfac-
tual, exercises. Nevertheless, it provides a useful
framework to monitor and quantify default risks. For33 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2008
this reason, we believe it is worth developing further,
although it should not be a main focus of our research
efforts.
Finally, given their significant role in linking the
components of the financial system, it is important
that further progress be made in the research on pay-
ment, clearing, and settlement systems. The functioning
of these systems is conditioned by the behaviour of
economic agents, indicating that these behaviours
need to be modelled explicitly. As well, given that there
can be feedback effects between these systems and the
rest of the financial system, we believe that these effects
should be factored into future research.
While signiﬁcant progress has been made in recent
yearstowards thedevelopment ofaframework toassess
ﬁnancial stability, much remains to be done, and this
ﬁeld of research should remain an exciting one.
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